Ukraine as a European Player
Ukraine is defending the borders and the freedom of Europe. If Russia emerges from the conflict as the victor, then it is not only Ukraine that loses, but the whole of Europe. A commentary by Rainhard Kloucek, Secretary General of the Paneuropa Movement Austria. This article was written for Unlimited Democracy.
Those Ukrainians who demonstrated, fought, and suffered (and in some cases died) on the Euromaidan in 2013/2014 for the European orientation of their homeland face at least three adversaries. The first adversary is the expectations of the Ukrainian people (including the younger generation) towards politics. The second is the still-dominant oligarchy, with adversary number one and adversary number two being inextricably linked. The third adversary is a Europe that is so preoccupied with its own internal problems, currents, and interests that it has no desire to engage more closely with a country that undoubtedly faces massive challenges. In this context, one must mention not only the first two adversaries but also the war waged by Russia against Ukraine.
The first adversary is a legacy of the old Soviet system. It is paternalism—the illusion sold to the people that the state will manage everything for the best. This is a phenomenon and a problem that is also increasingly troubling the welfare states in Europe. A president is elected in the hope that he will do better for the people than his predecessor. In doing so, it is completely ignored that some improvements are simply not within the Ukrainian president’s power. The Ukrainian president cannot truly end Russia’s war against the country. That is decided in Moscow. The only way Ukraine could bring about an end would be a military victory against its aggressive neighbour. Currently, this option is not realistic.
If the president does not improve the situation as promised or expected, then five years later another candidate is elected, even if one cannot judge exactly what their programme or political principles are. The main thing is that the promises—that he or she will do better—fit the mood.
The Legacies of the Soviet System
The second adversary is also a direct consequence of the old Soviet system. Here, however—to Ukraine’s benefit—there is a fundamental difference to Russia. There, the oligarchs believed they could rule the country until Vladimir Putin established himself as president and, simultaneously, as the oligarch of oligarchs. Oligarchs are allowed to be and remain wealthy, but they are not permitted to criticise the president’s policies. Viktor Yanukovych tried to transfer this system to Ukraine. He failed due to his own greed and lust for power.
The motives of the third adversary have already been briefly outlined. They are just as short-sighted as the unfulfillable expectations placed on a president, because the geopolitical situation takes no account of one’s own problems. The freedom of Ukraine is, in fact, decisive for the freedom of Europe, even if many in Europe refuse to see it.
This is linked to the fact that Ukraine is an unequivocally European country. It thus differs from its large eastern neighbour, which may have part of its landmass geographically in Europe, but whose cultural character is different. A brief look at history confirms this. This refers not only to the fact that the western part of Ukraine was part of a Central European multi-ethnic empire until just over 100 years ago. A probably decisive difference dates back to the time of the Golden Horde. Their rule over Ukraine was comparatively short-lived. Kyiv had already developed a European-style system of governance and was connected through trade with many other regions of Europe and the world when Moscow was still a Khanate. The Khanate’s form of rule shaped the governance of Russia. The Tsar, to put it bluntly, acted as a Great Khan, just as the General Secretary of the almighty CPSU did in the Soviet era and as the Russian president does now. It is a form of rule that demands submission. Power dictates, and ultimately the people must be prepared to endure suffering for the sake of that power. (Whether this will work in Russia in the long term cannot be addressed here.)
Russia and Europe
This form of rule distinguishes Russia not only from Ukraine but from the whole of Europe. Europe achieved its greatness through the rule of law. In systems governed by the rule of law, private property can develop, which in turn is a prerequisite for private entrepreneurship, from which attractive prosperity can emerge. Russia’s greatness is based on pure power politics.
This is by no means to suggest that Ukraine meets all the requirements of a system based on the rule of law. The aforementioned adversaries one and two (amongst other reasons) stand in the way. Notably, adversary number one is also active within EU-Europe, where the welfare state creates a dependency of citizens on the state—using their own money, no less—which in turn encourages paternalism.
Power politics to Moscow’s taste is based, as mentioned, on subordination. In its quest to act as a world power, Russia therefore has no interest in a united Europe. It would be too strong; it could act as a geopolitical force. Individual European nation-states can no longer do this. This is why Moscow supports forces in EU countries that want to reduce European integration to mere intergovernmental cooperation. This is why these parties in Europe seek a partnership with Moscow that would squeeze a series of Central European states back into the old concept of an “Intermediate Europe” (Zwischeneuropa). As long as European nation-states were still considered global actors, this concept of an Intermediate Europe could still be defended from a nationalist perspective. European powers and Russia would then have decided the fate of this buffer zone. However, from the moment no European state acts as a geopolitical player, Moscow would be the sole winner.
The statement by Russian President Vladimir Putin that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe can certainly be taken as a manifesto. With EU and NATO membership for many countries of the former Eastern Bloc, Moscow’s power over these nations has been broken. A European orientation for Ukraine (or indeed Georgia and Belarus) would be a defeat from Moscow’s perspective, as it would mean power could no longer be exerted.
Should Moscow succeed in bringing Ukraine back entirely into its sphere of influence, the motivation to venture further steps towards Central Europe would be great. And the aforementioned interventions via various political parties are just one small example.
The fate of Ukraine is important for Europe for a second reason. If Moscow succeeds in creating a split within the EU regarding the measures (so-called sanctions) taken against parts of the Russian system in response to the military aggression against Ukraine, Europe would be geopolitically castrated. This would be just as damaging for a European Ukraine as it would be for Europe as a whole.
