Mini-Schengen: No Practical Benefit?
Following the article on Mini-Schengen in the Balkans, we received a statement from Genc Pollo from Albania. Genc Pollo is a member of the Albanian Parliament and President of the Paneuropa Union Albania.
Exchange and cooperation in the Western Balkans are highly desirable, especially in light of the post-Yugoslav wars. However, at the start of the second decade of the century, one should be somewhat more ambitious regarding the quality of cooperation. And also cautious with the overarching framework. In this respect, there are several concerns in the region regarding the Mini-Schengen initiative.
The realisation of the four EU freedoms in the Western Balkans is a mere platitude: the EU originated as an intergovernmental treaty – from the ECSC to the EU of the Lisbon Treaty. The same can be said of the Schengen Agreement, in which not all EU states (yet) participate. Between the six Western Balkan states (WB6), similar agreements are politically almost impossible and also undesirable. They would partially contradict the Stabilisation and Association Agreement that each of these states has concluded with the EU.
The good intentions to remove regional trade barriers and grant better access to the labour market could be achieved bilaterally. To my knowledge, there are at least two regional cooperation initiatives for this: the Central European Initiative and the SEECP, which were launched in the 1990s, are stalled, and are anchored in the EU. In 2006, within the framework of the SEECP, the Western Balkan countries agreed on trade agreements among themselves and with other members, known as CEFTA. Within this framework, the WB6 could take further steps towards facilitating tariff and non-tariff trade, as well as measures for mutual opening of the labour market. Freedom of movement has been achieved bilaterally, as most WB6 citizens can cross most WB6 borders with just an ID card. Thanks to bilateral agreements. An abolition of border controls à la Schengen is not advisable. It would also create problems with the WB6’s EU visa liberalisation agreements (except for Kosovo).
Perhaps this is why, in November, the responsible minister of the Montenegrin government described the Mini-Schengen initiative as having ‘no practical benefit or added value’, stating that ‘the issues raised are better handled within the framework of existing agreements.’ If Messrs Vučić (Aleksandar Vučić: President of Serbia, ed.), Rama (Edi Rama, Prime Minister of Albania, ed.), and Zaev (Zoran Zaev, Prime Minister of Macedonia, ed.) wanted to advance the deepening of regional cooperation on the right path towards a united Europe, it would have been appropriate for them to have done so within the SEECP framework.
There are concerns regarding an ex novo initiative. The fact that Serbia recently joined the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union, and also holds observer status in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation, reinforces these concerns.
Regarding Kosovo: perhaps Kosovo’s reasons for not participating in the Mini-Schengen initiative are similar to those of Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. These likely include the political trauma following the – thank God – failed attempt to partition Kosovo territorially in order to cede the northern part to Serbia. The support for this highly un-European attempt by the Mogherini Commission does not make matters any better.
The Mini-Schengen initiative may, as Vučić said in December, very well fail. But it has already caused damage by publicly exposing Kosovo as a ‘problem country’. Who would take Kosovo’s explanation for its absence seriously if Albania is involved? Therefore, many in Tirana believe that Kosovo should have been included from the very beginning. Only then should Albania participate in such an initiative. Furthermore, Tirana is contractually obliged to coordinate with Prishtina on these matters. Why Edi Rama failed to do so, he has yet to explain.
